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JUDGES AND JUDICIAL PROCESS IN
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ST.
THOMAS AQUINASt
CHARLES P. NEMETH, J.D., PH.D., LL.M.*
St. Thomas' holistic picture of the human player makes it
impossible for him to separate judicial function from personhood.
The just man or woman will be the just judge. The virtuous
disposition lends itself to a determination of what is due or not
due. Other features of the judgeship do not escape St. Thomas'
cutting mind. To judge, one must be in public officialdom and not
occupy any ecclesiastical position and title. To judge laws
correctly, St. Thomas favors the school of textualism known as
"strict constructionism." To judge soundly, St. Thomas exhorts
judicial officers to weigh and assess the credibility of witnesses
and evidence, to afford a series of procedural and judicial rights,
to rely on proper documentation, and to permit legitimate
defenses (an elaborate procedural code is made available to
defense and prosecution so that the truth may be tested in the
legal arena). Most critically, St. Thomas permits judges to
disregard, and even disavow the "unjust" law that is contrary to
his jurisprudence of the telos.
t This chapter is reprinted by permission of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.,
and will be forthcoming as Chapter 9, "Law, Justice, Lawyers and Advocates," in
AQUINAS IN THE COURTROOM: LAWYERS, JUDGES AND JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, by Charles P. Nemeth. This text has also been made available in
hardcover through Greenwood Press and paperback through Praeger Press in
August of 2001.
* Professor of Criminal Justice, the State University of New York at Brockport;
Member of the Pennsylvania, New York, and North Carolina Bars.
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I. THE JUDGE IN THOMISTIC JURISPRUDENCE
Any key role or position in the justice system envisioned by
St. Thomas can only carry out task and function when in accord
with St. Thomas' overall philosophy. Judges are not only expected
to pay more than glancing attention to the ideals of Thomistic
jurisprudence, but to live and abide by its content. Judges short
on justice and other virtues, or devoid of any teleological
conception of law, will poorly perform the most basic of judicial
functions, whether judgment, sentencing, evidentiary analysis, or
testimonial evaluation. As ordinary men and women, judges are
not a separate category of human species, but are endowed like
any other rational being. St. Thomas calls judging a "craft,"1
indistinguishable from human identity. The judicial capacity to
deliver any version of justice is tied to our operative powers. As
St. Thomas notes:
Just as there pre-exists in the mind of the craftsman an
expression of the things to be made externally by his craft,
which expression is called the rule of his craft, so too there
pre-exists in the mind an expression of the particular just
work which the reason determines, and which is a kind of
rule of prudence. 2
Being a judge is not simply a job or occupational description,
but a vocation, arising in and from the person who happens to
engage in the particular role. The Thomistic impression of
vocation and profession inevitably winds its way back to human
capacity. Every person, including any judge, employs reason and
the internal law of human existence to rule and measure. Each
person is imprinted with the natural law, which is naturally
known by man,3 and each person can easily discern the secondary
principles with minor reflection. The natural law itself is man's
participation in the eternal law of God 4 and is woven into the fiber
of the human person. St. Thomas resists the divisibility of person
and craft and instead unifies them. Law is more than a craft,
more than a series of competencies and behavioral obligations.
1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, 2 SuMMA THEOLOGICA pt. Il-Il, Q.57, art. 1, reply obj.
2, at 1431 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros.
1947).
2 Id.
3 See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, in 2 BASIC WRITINGS OF
SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS Q. 93, art. 4, at 762, 766-67 (Anton C. Pegis, ed. 1945).
4 See id. Q. 91, art.2, at 750.
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Law is a reflection of our unceasing and unquenchable thirst for
what is true and good for justice itself. At the forefront, judges
serve as gatekeepers to the judicial process and as arbiters of
disputes. Judges must be persons of virtue and integrity. St.
Thomas disqualifies those unfit in soul and those "who stand
guilty of grievous sins"5 from the judicial role because such people
"should not judge those who are guilty of the same or lesser sins."6
A judge deficient in moral or intellectual virtue is incapable of
judging correctly. A judge failing to exercise right reason will
predictably issue improper and incoherent rulings. An unjust
judge not only lacks justice but also lacks the other virtues
necessary for the good life, acting not in accordance with the
prescription for the moral life, but contrary to its ends. 7 St.
Thomas' judge labors in a holistic manner, extending beyond the
functional sense, blending competency of task with competency of
soul. A "judge's task is justice."s The perfectly good person is the
perfectly good judge "subject to the overruling of providence as is
all creation."9 The Thomistic judge implores for more than respect
or jurisprudence exclusively dependent on "social practices and
usages."o
The validity or regularity of judicial decision-making is not
rooted in the chimerical theme of respect-that chameleon of
amorality-but upon a natural moral law that generates and
announces some fundamental precepts for human living. Judges
judge correctly when being attentive to reason and the divine
imprint as St. Thomas outlines in the Summa Contra Gentiles1l:
Moreover, it is the function of every lawmaker to determine
by law the things without which observation of the law is
impossible. Now, since law is proposed to reason, man
5 AQUINAS, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 60, art. 2, reply obj. 3, at 1447.
6 Id.
7 One of the few close looks at Thomistic jurisprudence in contemporary legal
practice is the essay by Rev. Michael Harding, True Justice in Courts of Law, in
3 SUMMA THEOLOGICA 3348-49. (Fathers of the English Dominican Province
trans., Benziger Bros. 1947).
8 Joseph V. Dolan, Natural Law and the Judicial Function, 16 LAVAL
THEOLOGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE 94, 107 (1960).
9 ETIENNE GILSON, LAW ON THE HuMAN LEVEL: MORAL VALUES AND THE
MORAL LIFE 197 (Leo Richard Ward trans., The Shoe String Press, Inc. 1961).
10 Neil MacCormick, Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals, in
NATURAL LAW THEORY 105, 107 (Robert P. George ed., Clarendon Press 1992).
11 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES (Vernon J. Bourke trans.,
Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1975).
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would not follow the law unless all the other things which
belong to man were subject to reason. So, it is the function
of divine law to command the submission to reason of all the
other factors proper to man. 12
The true judge does all in accord with reason while the
malicious and errant judge subverts human nature, by
disregarding reason's instructions and the indelibly imprinted
inclinations in our being. Gilson contrasts the just versus the
unjust judge:
The judge who in justice condemns on mere suspicion
commits the most serious of sins against justice, since
instead of judging according to rights, he is violating them.
His act is a direct offense against the very virtue it is his
duty to exercise. (citation omitted) Where there is no
certitude, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the
accused. The judge's duty, to be sure, is to chastise the
guilty, and all of us must condemn the wicked in our inner
forum. But it is better to err many times by acquitting the
guilty than even rarely to condemn the innocent.13
The true judge avoids sentimentality, personal preference
and opinion, and is unafraid of carrying out both the unpopular
and popular purposes of the law. The responsible judge is the
equalizer, the bearer of proportionality and the restorer of
equilibrium. Judging is lawful only when consistent with the
ends of justice itself and to be proper, its root power rests in the
"sovereign as a master-virtue, (citation omitted) commanding and
prescribing what is just."14
Judges, when delivering judicial sentences such as death,
imprisonment, or restitution, do not sin against the person upon
whom punishment is imposed.15 Neither is the sentence
imposition, if varied according to circumstance, a sin against the
respect of the person. 6 Punishment responds to the sin itself. To
the misfortune of the incarcerated or charged party, judges should
not only focus on the individual dilemma but the need for a
restoration of personal or communal equality. A judge's judgment
12 Id. at 142.
13 ETIENNE GILSON, THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 311
(L.K. Shook trans., Random House 1956).
14 AQUINAS, supra note 1, pt. II-I, Q. 60, art. 1, reply obj. 4, at 1447.
15 See id. pt. II-II, Q. 63, art. 4, at 1465.
16 See id. pt. II-II, Q.63, art. 1, at 1462.
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is just if it restores the individual harmed or benefits the common
good. 17 A judge may determine therefore, according to the
distributive philosophy of justice that certain cases or situations
are to be decided differently relative to circumstance, parties or
other mitigating factors. In this circumstance, St. Thomas urges
jurists to weigh and evaluate cases on more than the pertinent
statute or code, on more than the written language of the law, in
order to avoid becoming wholly dependent on punishment as the
sole basis for the judicial process. St. Thomas issues sound
advice:
[J]udgment is an act of justice, in as much as the judge
restores to the equality of justice, those things which may
cause an opposite inequality. Now respect of persons
involves a certain inequality, in so far as something is
allotted to a person out of that proportion to him in which
the equality of justice consists.18
Inequality entails neither an intentional injustice or harm,
nor the willful disregard for what is in equilibrium, but a
reflection of life's varying stations and degrees. 19 The quality of
the justice may differ for those empowered by money, political
power, or social class, and those less fortunate.
II. THE FORMAL REQUIREMENTS OF A JUDGESHIP
St. Thomas expends considerable time outlining the
formalities of judicial qualification from diverse viewpoints: 1)
qualities and attributes; 2) requirements and qualifications; 3)
function and decision-making.20 St. Thomas is very serious about
the formal prerequisites for being a judge, since the authority of a
judge is granted by the sovereign, the king, or the populace.
Temporal authority, in addition to divine providence, empowers
jurists. Judges effecting judgments do so by "authority from the
ruler to do sO."21 As a result, judges do not operate in some
individual domain but from public authority.
17 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 63, art. 4, reply obj. 1, at 1465.
18 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 63, art. 4, at 1465.
19 Id.
20 Id. pt. II-Il, Q. 60, art. 2, at 1447.
21 GILSON, supra note 12, at 310.
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A. The Judge as Public Official
Throughout his jurisprudence, St. Thomas makes plain that
the task of judging is reserved to public officialdom. Judgment
and judging resides in the individual endowed with some form of
authority. Without formal sanction a judge's act is non-binding.22
St. Thomas goes out of his way to repeatedly deliberate on this
aspect, one example referencing the Book of Deuteronomy. "Thou
shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all thy gates... that they
may judge the people with just judgment."23
Judging, St. Thomas advances, is by its nature a public act,
necessitating public position, even when dealing with the
"hidden"24 subject matter. Judicial process itself-the operation of
courts, evidence, witnesses, and testimony-represent a system
built in the public domain. Private judicial process dismantles
any notion of how a justice system should operate. To further his
argument, St. Thomas condemns any form of judging exerted by
private individuals. He labels private adjudication a usurpation25
of, and of a perverse,26 judicial process. St. Thomas' judge stands
before not only the individual but also the entire community of
inhabitants because Judges interpret and enforce the law not
according to individual demands alone, but, more appropriately,
according to the collective intention of a political and social
system. By focusing on the public side of a judgeship, St. Thomas
emphasizes the social, political, and ethical relationship between
individual and society. Moreover, this idea cautions jurists to
remember their station and purpose and to be mindful of a judge's
public, communal accountability. St. Thomas avidly portrays this
public responsibility:
Now since it belongs to the same authority to interpret and
to make a law, just as a law cannot be made save by public
authority, so neither can a judgment be pronounced except
by public authority, which extends over those who are
subject to the community. Wherefore even as it would be
22 See AQUINAS, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 67, art. 1 at 1482-83; see also
GEORGE QUENTIN FRIEL, PUNISHMENT IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SAINT THOMAS
AQUINAS AND AMONG SOME PRIMITIVE PEOPLES 126 (The Catholic Univ. of Am.,
diss. 1939).
23 AQUINAS, supra note 1, pt. II-Il, Q. 60, art. 2, at 1447 (quoting
Deuteronomy 16:18).
24 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 60, art. 2, reply obj. 3, at 1447.
25 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 60, art. 6, at 1450.
26 Id.
JUDGES AND JUDICIAL PROCESS
unjust for one man to force another to observe a law that
was not approved by public authority, so too it is unjust, if a
man compels another to submit to a judgment that is
pronounced by other than the public authority.27
St. Thomas is unflinchingly determined about the public
nature of judicial office. While advocating the justness of the
death penalty sentence in select cases, he firmly excludes any
private citizen the right to pronounce or carry it out. Public
authority28 tends to weigh any issue in a greater collective sense,
while the whims of the private citizen, whose disposition is less
concerned with the general welfare than that of his own lot, will
be unpredictable. St. Thomas is reticent, almost nervous, about
the prospect of a private citizenry entrusted with the power to
inflict punishment. Individualized, vigilante justice is
antagonistic to the common good.29 One entrusted by political
mandate or appointment perceives the responsibility on a grander
scale.
That same reservation about privatized judges is quite clear
in St. Thomas' objection to a cleric or churchman charged with
orchestrating the death penalty. It belongs to a public official,
whose views and perceptions emerge from a more comprehensive
landscape, to deliver this type of sentence. Urging ecclesiastical
prelates to "imitate their master",30 Jesus Christ, St. Thomas
reserves the power of this penalty to those in the juridical realm.
The separation of ecclesiastical and juridical functions is an
unequivocal requirement for the justice system, so much so that
St. Thomas passionately "condemns"31 religious who utilize formal
judicial process to achieve particular aims.32 As noted above, the
law in human terms is incapable of addressing, advancing, or
eradicating all that is wrong with the world 33 -an ambition
rightfully reserved to ecclesiastical powers, whose task is
primarily the salvation of souls. This salvation end-game is not
27 Id.; see also Dolan, supra note 8, at 109.
28 AQUINAS, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 3, at 1467.
29 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 3, at 1468.
30 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 4, at 1468.
31 See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, AN APOLOGY FOR THE RELIGIOUS ORDERS 301-13
(Fr. John Procter ed., B. Herder Book Co. 1902).
32 See id.
33 1 id. pt. I-II, Q. 96, art. 2, at 1018 (Fathers of the English Dominican
Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947).
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the province of the lawmaker, the jurist, or the judge.34 Only by
experience, training, and application will a judge be capable of
issuing sound legal decisions. The private individual and the
churchman has no such competency; therefore, St. Thomas
declares, "[It is unjust for anyone to be judged by one who has no
public authority."3s
B. The Judge as Legal Interpreter
Another facet of St. Thomas' jurisprudence worth a closer
look, is his philosophy of judicial interpretation. What does a
judge rely upon when interpreting law and facts? When
deliberating, how much does the text of a law guide the arbiter?
How dependent is the interpreter on external knowledge,
principles of equity, and legislative history? How does a judge
most accurately interpret and apply legal principles?
Generally, St. Thomas can be labeled a strict constructionist-
the school of legal thought vigorously attentive to text, the written
language of the law, when resolving a legal question. By contrast,
a judicial activist uses the language of the law as an interpretive
starting point, subsequently jumping off into other dimensions
when ready to declare a decision or finding. An illustration of the
activist is the assertion of a constitutional right to homosexual
activity under the First Amendment's free exercise of religion or
free press terminology.36 Aghast, the strict constructionist looks at
religion and press from the literal meaning, while the activist
imagines an abridged freedom tangentially tied to nonexistent
language, whether by inference or imputation. As judicial
activists are so prone to doing, they invent penumbras37 of
privacy, none of which are explicitly enunciated in the
Constitution, to further their goal of inclusion, while the strict
constructionist goes no further than the text on the table. St.
Thomas' theory of interpretation is by most measures strict:
3 See Charles D. Skok, PRUDENT CIVIL LEGISLATION ACCORDING TO ST.
THOMAS AND SOME CONTROVERSIAL AMERICAN LAW 123 (Pontificiam
Universitatem S. Thomae, diss. 1967).
35 AQUINAS, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 60, art. 6, reply obj. 1, at 1451.
36 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (addressing whether
a fundamental right of privacy exists for sodomy purposes).
37 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (finding that a right
to use contraceptives falls under the penumbra of the constitutional right of
privacy); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973) (finding that the implied
constitutional right of privacy encompasses abortions).
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"[HIence it is necessary to judge according to the written law, else
judgment would fall short either of the natural or of the positive
right."38
For St. Thomas, written language provides an anchor for law
and its interpretation. He believed that "Ujludgment must be
rendered according to the written law."39 From a practical
perspective, judicial interpretation depends upon a consistent
benchmark- that of the written law-because without a writing,
the interpretation would produce an endless array of results. But
writings are not the sole grounds for legal principles or ideas. The
wise interpreter can never forget that natural rights, granted to
man by his God and implanted by the natural law, are relevant to
any legal interpretation. These natural rights may or may not
take written form, but assuredly, no written law can contravene
the purposes of these natural rights.40 St. Thomas suggests no
allegiance to any written law contrary to the teleological
principles so often announced, nor any adherence to the word of
said laws since such laws are "corruptions of law,... and
consequently judgment should not be delivered according to
them."41 Laws inconsistent and contrary to the eternal, natural,
and divine legal continuum are not laws at all, and a text
enabling this type of law is not worthy of our interpretation, as
such laws are "unjust"2 and have "no binding force."43 When a
Thomistic interpretation occurs, one must not detach oneself from
the ethical and moral dimensions infused in the law. Adherence
to textual meaning depends upon adherence to the teleological
and moral order of St. Thomas, as well as the words of the law. 44
C. Evidence and Credibility
Continuing his discourse on legal interpretation, St. Thomas
gauges not only his method of judicial interpretation but also lays
out sound suggestions on how a judge should weigh evidentiary
quality. Since judges are expected to rule on evidentiary
38 AQUINAS, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 60, art. 5, at 1450.
39 See FRIEL, supra note 21, at 127.
40 See id.
41 AQUINAS, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 60, art. 5, reply obj. 1, at 1450.
42 Id.
43 Id.
4 For a further explanation of this proposition, see HEINRICH A. ROMMEN,
THE NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN LEGAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 188
(Thomas R. Hanley, trans., B. Herder Book Co. 1947).
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questions-such as admissibility, suppression, limitation and
exclusion-their rulings need adequate grounding. In general, St.
Thomas admonishes the jurist to avoid any judgment that is
grounded upon suspicion, as certainty is the mettle of evidentiary
quality. Suspicion consists not of factual certitude, but "evil
thinking based on slight indications."45 Certainty insures credible
judgment, which in turn assures justice. Certainty is not
infallibility, but a significant evidentiary quality which is "not
indeed the certainty of a demonstration, but such as is befitting
the matter in point."46 A judge, as mediator between the plaintiff
and defendant, regularly issues rulings on evidentiary questions,
and is expected to provide an environment where the evidence
submitted and admitted is of inherent credibility.
Addressing whether more than two or three witnesses are
mandatory for credibility purposes, St. Thomas characterizes the
numerical requirements of witnesses as artificial and unreliable:
For in human acts, on which judgments are passed and
evidence required, it is impossible to have demonstrative
certitude, because they are about things contingent and
variable. Hence the certitude of probability suffices, such as
may reach the truth in the greater number of cases,
although it fail in the minority.47
Witness testimony which is contradictory on material matters
can still be admitted into evidence since the contrasts illuminate
the dilemma at hand, and allow a beneficial doubt to flourish on
behalf of a particular party. St. Thomas analyzes these shifting
burdens and presumptions with uncanny legal insight. In most
cases, St. Thomas recommends the accused being given the
"benefit of the doubt."48 That is, he suggests the evidence is to be
favorably construed for the defendant rather than for the plaintiff
or the prosecutor:
The evidence is not weakened if one witness says that he
does not remember, while the other attests to a determinate
time or place. And if on such points as these the witnesses
for prosecution and defense disagree altogether, and if they
be equal in number on either side, and of equal standing,
the accused should have the benefit of the doubt, because
45 AQUINAS, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 60, art. 3, at 1448.
46 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 60, art. 3, reply obj. 1, at 1448.
47 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 70, art. 2, at 1494.
48 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 70, art. 2, reply obj. 2, at 1494.
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the judge ought to be more inclined to acquit than to
condemn, except perhaps in favorable suits, such as a
pleading for liberty and the like.49
Amazingly, St. Thomas differentiates evidence-its content,
quality, and contestability-from the essence of the person
offering it by the truth or falsity of a particular allegation. Put
another way, St. Thomas can scrutinize the defendant or the
plaintiff from the very evidence before the trier of fact. What is
proffered into evidence may be true yet rejected, and practical
wisdom demands that the judge and jury be capable of
differentiating legal and factual truth. In this fashion, an
evidentiary record may be so insubstantial that it frees a guilty
defendant, or it may appear so formidable as to award a
disproportionate damage award to a feigning party. "[E]vidence is
not infallible but probable; and consequently the evidence for one
side is weakened by whatever strengthens the probability of the
other."50
Like a seasoned judge, St. Thomas also categorizes
testimonial evidence that is naturally suspect because of the party
or circumstances involved in it. Credibility, therefore, depends on
the message and the messenger. Those laboring under a defect of
reason-the imbecile, the infant, and in an utterly sexist vein,
"women"51, or "persons united by family or household ties, or
again owing to some external condition, as in the case of poor
people, slaves, and those who are under authority, concerning
whom it is to be presumed that they might easily be induced to
give evidence against the truth,"59-are other troublesome
evidentiary categories for St. Thomas. Modern day experts in
judicial process evaluate the credibility of witnesses and
testimony using similar strategies.53  "Saint Thomas would
exclude from giving testimony men labouring under defects of bad
character, as unbelievers and persons of evil repute, as well as
49 Id.
50 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 70, art. 3, at 1495.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See generally CHARLES P. NEMETH, LITIGATION, PLEADINGS AND
ARBITRATION,. (2nd ed., Anderson Publishing Co. 1997); LAWRENCE S. CHARFOOS
AND DAVID W. CHRISTENSEN, PERSONAL INJURY PRACTICE: TECHNIQUE AND
TECHNOLOGY (Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1986); PAUL FUQUA AND JAMES WILSON,
SECURITY INVESTIGATOR'S HANDBOOK (1979) for a discussion of various
techniques.
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those who are guilty of a public crime, and who are not allowed
even to accuse."54
St. Thomas grants every witness a presumption of honesty
and integrity and "good is to be presumed of everyone unless the
contrary appear (citation omitted)."5 By presumption St. Thomas
recognizes the need for witnesses to be given the benefit of the
doubt. Doubt is weighed not to benefit the prosecutorial attorney
but the beleaguered party being prosecuted. Doubts generate
incredible, not credible, evidence in St. Thomas' eyes, and judges
should avoid decision-making on these shaky grounds.
He who interprets doubtful matters for the best, may
happen to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better to
err frequently through thinking well of a wicked man, than
to err less frequently through having an evil opinion of a
good man, because in the latter case an injury is inflicted,
but not in the former.5 6
Judges are required to preferentially weigh disputed and
doubtful evidence on behalf of a defendant and to avoid an
obsession to convict or condemn. A judge must always be mindful
of the possibility that inordinate zeal may lead to the
condemnation of an innocent person.
At no place is the evidentiary genius of St. Thomas more
apparent than in his discussion of evidence, truth, and the power
of a judge to rule.57 St. Thomas integrates the role and occupation
of a judge with that of a human person who dons the robes. St.
Thomas vigorously corrects the advocate who thinks it is possible
for a judge to separate judicial decision-making from the evidence
presented. Cases of every kind can be decided on a host of
rationales that lack evidentiary rigor; these rationales include
sentimental, racist, political, criminally corrupt, mindless, or
angry decision-making. St. Thomas scolds those who want justice
without the evidentiary record to support it. In one case, a judge,
as a person, may know or feel something which has not been
submitted by the advocates. In another case, the formal record of
evidence may be insubstantial and vacuous. How does the judge
decide? It is the judge's role as information gatherer that
provides the basis for judicial reasoning, not the private
54 See FRIEL, supra note 21, at 136.
55 AQUINAS, supra note 1, pt. Il-II, Q. 70, art. 3, at 1495.
56 Id. pt. II-I, Q. 60, art. 4, reply obj. 1, at 1449.
57 See id. pt. II-II, Q. 67, art. 2, at 1483.
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knowledge of the citizen who dons the robes. Judgement is "based
on information acquired by him, not from his knowledge as a
private individual, but from what he knows as a public person."58
If that same judge cannot pronounce judgment on the
evidence presented, acquittal or dismissal is proper. Accordingly,
St. Thomas suggests the real, indisputable truth may exist
simultaneously with a legal truth, which is derived from either
strong or weak evidence. In every case before the court, decisions
have to be rooted in the evidence. The judge may know, after
sifting through the evidentiary record, that a decision soon to be
rendered is contrary to the truth of the matter. Legal truth
depends so heavily upon the court's evidentiary record that any
judgment rendered will rest more upon this legally suspect
conclusion than the unsubstantiated, though truthful, allegation.
For St. Thomas, the personal conscience of a judge is subject to
the functionality of the judgeship. "In matters touching his own
person, a man must form his conscience from his own knowledge,
but in matters concerning the public authority, he must form his
conscience in accordance with the knowledge attainable in the
public judicial procedure."59 St. Thomas respected the province of
the jury as fact-finder, and he cautioned judges to show respect
for deliberations even though the judges knew differently.
It is apparent that St. Thomas affords significant respect to
evidentiary matters at many points in his legal writings. The
business of judgment, as delivered by judges and juries, is no
small matter. Our efforts to judge rightly, humbly, and
adequately pale before the Divine judge who deliberates in perfect
equilibrium and who accords proper weight and credibility to each
class of evidence, as well as knowing when to convict and when to
acquit. The human agent, as in every facet of existence, struggles
to get it right. What is certain is the magnitude St. Thomas
attributes to evidentiary credibility. The ramifications posed by
St. Thomas for false testimony elucidate the centrality of
evidential integrity in St. Thomas' jurisprudence. Terming
falsehood in evidence a "mortal sin, "60 any judgement that arises
from such testimony will be "unjust" and not a judgment in any
sense. 61 False testimony is graphically described by St. Thomas
58 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 67, art. 2, at 1484.
59 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 67, art. 2, reply obj. 4, at 1484.
60 Id. pt. I-I, Q. 70, art. 4, at 1496 (emphasis added).
61 Id.
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as a "deformity."62 This condemnation is supported by St. Thomas'
description of perjury as a "contempt of God"63 that incurs the
penalties pertinent to mortal sin. This is graver than infamy
when viewed in a court of law.64
A final suggestion from St. Thomas, relating to quality of
judicial interpretation, involved experience and practical wisdom.
Legal decision-making is best when prudentially executed.
Experienced judges are fortunate enough to predict impacts and
ramifications and to discover how singular rulings influence the
communal whole. Judges and lawmakers, as St. Thomas
recommended in his Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean
Ethics, are most effective when experienced. "But the
inexperienced understandably are ignorant whether a work is
done well or badly, on the basis of what is in books. Now laws are,
as it were, the effects of the art of politics."65 So much of modern
judicial activism lacks this perspective. Time and experience do
much to advance judicial wisdom, St. Thomas determined. "But
those who review things of this kind without ability cannot
properly judge except by chance; although they will become more
capable of understanding them."66
III. JUDICIAL PROCESS
In the area of courtroom and judicial processes, St. Thomas
provided a remarkable series of procedural insights. Respect for
person, in the roles of defendant and plaintiff, is a hallmark of St.
Thomas' judicial process. Respect for authority, either a ruler,
state or a judge as decision-maker, is an equally important
criteria in St. Thomas' justice machinery. St. Thomas' justice
enterprise is developed not in the spur of the moment, nor as an
afterthought, but is a well-thought out, artfully devised system of
legal checks and balances. Included are procedural and
substantive protections for the litigating parties, caveats and
restraints on judicial demeanor, and a dedication to the rule of
law.
62 Id. (emphasis added).
63 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 98, art. 3, at 1618.
64 See id. (emphasis added).
65 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, (C. I.
Litzinger trans., Henry Regnery Co. 1964) X. L.XVI: C 2176.
66 Id. at 2178.
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Judges are delegated the responsibilities of assuring these
procedural rights, the conduct of court, and the integrity of the
litigants. What remains here is a brief overview of rules and
standards relevant to judicial conduct and courtroom
expectations.
A. The Jurisdictional Mandate
Early in his discussion, St. Thomas cuts to the issue of
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, the right of a court to hear a case,
based on authority over person or particular subject matter, erects
a procedural forum and locale. Jurisdiction, for example, over tax
matters is reserved to the tax court, patents to the patent court,
and appeals to the appellate court. St. Thomas' admonition that
only public authorities have the power to judge is also a
jurisdictional question. Private parties lack both the power and
the jurisdictional authority to hear or resolve a case, while public
figures can declare the jurisdictional mandate. St. Thomas
claimed that a judge lacks jurisdiction to judge if the power to do
so had not been delegated,67 nor will the judge be competent if
devoid of any ordinary juridical authority. Lacking power-the
authority to bind or oblige-St. Thomas would dismiss any
proceedings in a case of faulty jurisdiction. As the general law
has a coercive power or quality, the judgeship depends upon the
same; otherwise, proclamations from judicial authority would be
of minimal effect. St. Thomas unreservedly connected the
authority of law with the occupational efficacy of the law since "[a]
judge's sentence is like a particular law regarding some particular
fact."68 Further illustrating his procedural rigor, St. Thomas
offered an advanced theory of pendant and/or ancillary
jurisdiction whereby two courts, e.g., state and federal, have
province over the same person or subject matter. In his example,
dual jurisdiction of monk/monastery and monk/state would exist
for religious infractions if the once "exempt[ed]"69 religious
committed murder or theft.
B. The Role ofAccusation
St. Thomas said no case should proceed to formal litigation
67 See AQUINAS, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 67, art.1, at 1482.
68 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 67, art. 1, at 1483.
69 See id. (emphasis added).
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without an accusation. To accuse is to trigger a systematic
response. Accusation, according to St. Thomas, is the first
maneuver in a series of moves in the typical criminal litigation.
The judge and the justice system stand idle until a complaint and
a complainant-a victim and a perpetrator-emerge. Crime
victims are "bound"70 to accuse, not only for their good, but also for
the common interests and safety of the community. The solid
citizen reports and screams loudly of injustice. St. Thomas'
obligatory tone in the case of criminal activity does more than
suggest the reporting of criminal conduct, but urges a full-scale
public pronouncement. Individuals who idly sit by as crime
increases are injurious to the "commonwealth," detrimentum
reipublicae, and are an agent in the "bodily or spiritual corruption
of the community."71
Judges are not warranted or justified in proceeding with any
case if lacking an accused or an accusation. In St. Thomas' world,
the court insists on two parties to a criminal case; the state's
allegation alone is not sufficient. Lacking either a plaintiff or
defendant, a case is merely in expectancy.
A judge is paralyzed until an accusation crystallizes, and St.
Thomas sternly critiques any judge who decides, condemns, or
penalizes a defendant without the existence of an accuser and an
accusation. St. Thomas insisted on the necessity of accusation:
[J]ustice is not between a man and himself but between one
man and another. Hence a judge must... judge between
two parties, which is the case when one is the prosecutor,
and the other the defendant. Therefore in criminal cases
the judge cannot sentence a man unless the latter has an
accuser ...."72
So convinced of the importance of accusation, that
confrontational quality which apprizes defendants of what
criminal acts or civil wrongs are alleged, St. Thomas requires that
it be memorialized in a writing. The business of criminal
litigation is so serious that St. Thomas wanted the parties to be
accurate in their assertions, to be confident of the facts and legal
queries at hand, and to deliver to the court an initial record from
which the conduct of trial can be governed. Verbal allegations
70 Id. pt. II-I, Q. 68, art. 1, at 1486.
71 Id.
72 Id. pt. II-Il, Q. 67, art. 3, at 1484.
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transform into faded memories and any judgment or sentencing
that was drawn up without the aid and assistance of a
memorialized record is likely to cause injustice. It is the judge
that "stands between the accuser and the accused for the purpose
of the trial of justice, wherein it behooves one to proceed on
certainties, as far as possible."73 Writings also may serve as a
testimonial substitute, a permanent record for evidentiary
purposes, and as a basis or report for a judge's sentence.
Accusations based on puffery, braggadocio, collusion, or evasion 74
are unacceptable in any litigation. During St. Thomas' time, as
now, victims and witnesses were amply capable of inventing or
devising less than credible accusations. To charge falsely is to
calumniate the accused; to collude is to team up with others to
invent an accusation; to evade is to fail to report even though
true. 5 Any defect in the accuser or the accused, or the accusation
itself, is declared by St. Thomas injurious to the person and the
common good. The accuser "must eschew any total withdrawal of
the accusation which would be in detriment to the common
good."76 False accusations must be harshly and swiftly dismissed
and remedied. Mistakes or errors in process, charges, or loss of
memory do not rise to the level of unjust accusation, and may be
modified or corrected.
False accusation can justify retaliation whereby the wrongful
accuser suffers like "punishment."77 To achieve equilibrium, St.
Thomas suggests retaliation to cure the imbalance through a
"punishment of disgrace" 8 for those falsely accusing.
C. The Power to Punish
St. Thomas reserves the right to punish for public and legal
officers and forbids the imposition of punishment by private and
ecclesiastical authorities. Punishment personifies his theory of
justice and the virtues. Punishment is what is due. Judges are
delegated the power to punish, to sentence, to initiate the loss or
forfeiture of rights, to imprison, to physically penalize and to
execute. With justice as the centerpiece in a sentencing policy,
73 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 68, art. 2, at 1487.
74 See id. pt. II-II, Q. 68, art. 3, at 1488.
75 See id.
76 FRIEL, supra note 21, at 131.
77 AQUINAS, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 68, art. 4, at 1488.
78 Id. pt. II-II, Q. 68, art. 4, reply obj. 3, at 1489.
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the judge is attuned to proportionality and equality. Thomistic
jurisprudence affords wide-ranging judicial discretion in the
application and enforcement of sentences, but admonishes the
judge who exerts too much power, especially when unilaterally
deciding that a lawful and just sentence should be remitted. St.
Thomas does not forbid the demonstration of mercy and
individualized case-by-case review. Part of his work dwells upon
the nature of mitigation, depicted by ignorance, accident, and
involuntary acts. This form of judicial discretion is appropriate to
the role of judge. 79  In denying a judge the right to remit
punishment, St. Thomas justifies his refusal on two fronts: first,
that the parties who have just litigated and adjudicated their
cases would be left in an imbalanced, imperfect situation; second,
to remit punishment, a judge would undermine the fundamental
responsibility of a judge.80 St. Thomas imparts any right to
remission in the ruler, the sovereign power whose acts "do not
seem detrimental to the public good."81
79 See id. pt. II-II, Q. 67, art. 4, at 1485.
80 Id.
81 Id.
